Five Brothers and a War

Operation Manna/Chowhound

The Allied militarily authorities and planners, led by Royal Air Force Air Commodore Andrew Geddes (in the RAF, the rank Air Commodore is a one-star officer—equivalent to Brigadier General in the army), continued to explore the possibilities of supplying food by air, which had first been suggested in November 1944, at the very beginning of the crisis manifesting itself. But due to airfield demolition and general flooding, air landing was considered to be impractical. Parachutes were in too short supply to be used. It was felt, therefore, that the quickest and easiest method to ensure distribution over a wide area would be free dropping, where planes flew low and slow in order to just jettison the packages without parachutes. During the second week of April 1945, the Canadians were rapidly overrunning German positions in eastern Holland, having already taken over southern Holland the previous September. This was forcing the Germans into western Holland, or back to Germany before they were cut off from their supplies. The net effect was that by mid-April, Seyß Inquart had no land route back to Germany. And all of Wehrmacht forces in the western provinces were completely cut off. On April 13, the Allies began to receive messages through resistance channels saying that Seyß-Inquart wished to discuss ways and means of getting food to the starving Dutch. On a governmental level this intelligence was discussed ahead of the 46-nation international conference held at San Francisco (with the purpose of forming the United Nations). The official Canadian summary report says: “ . . . information coming from behind the German lines indicated that the food situation in Western Holland was getting steadily worse and that it was essential that something be done for the people there. In these circumstances, it was fortunate that the decline in the enemy’s fighting spirit on this front rendered it possible to make a temporary arrangement with him that would meet the need. At the middle of April contact was made with the Reichskommissar in Holland, the notorious Seyß-Inquart, through a representative of the Dutch resistance forces. Seyß-Inquart is reported to have spoken frankly. He said that he had been ordered “to hold out under all circumstances” and, if necessary, to carry out demolitions and inundations which would bring utter disaster upon the western provinces. He added, however, that if the Allies would halt their advance short of the Grebbe Line he could avoid taking such measures and at the same time save face with Berlin. In such a case he would refrain from further repressive action against the Dutch population. He also suggested his readiness to facilitate the movement of food into the provinces, and made it clear that in the case of Germany ceasing to resist he was prepared to surrender.” Prins Bernhard made his appeal for immediate food relief directly to Supreme Allied Commander General of the Army, Dwight Eisenhower (Montgomery had been made Field Marshal in September 1944, and therefore theoretically outranked Eisenhower—so the U.S. Congress promoted him on December 20, 1944, almost concurrently with George

the war

Five Brothers and a War

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